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Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on the defining the role of CRO in corporate governance and to show the 
interrelation between the way of CRO subordination and performance of investment bank. The sample 
consists of observations over a period of 2011 for 29 biggest investment banks (by amount of assets) 
implementing world-wide investment activity. The banks are originated in the USA (8), Eastern 
Europe (14), China (2), Japan (2), Canada (2), and Australia (1). With the aim to evaluate and compare 
financial performance of selected banks the construction of synthetic key performance indicator 
(SKPI) is worked out. The empirical analysis of risk management in the research is based on two 
different groups of factors, which could be used to evaluate the effectiveness of risk management in 
this sphere: analysis of CRO impact - Risk Management Committee factors and CRO factors, and 
Evaluation of Financial Performance. Results show that the CRO presence in investment banks effect 
positively on the financial performance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
After recent events of global financial crisis and 
further recession bank boards became more disturbed 
about the risk governance issues. The lesson was 
learned that timely risk oversight and measures to its 
minimization would lead to stability of a bank. That’s 
why the foundation and ensuring of effective 
functioning of Risk Management Committee in bank 
is one of the primary goals in this context.  
According to Basel Committee 
recommendations for enhancing corporate governance 
practice updated in 2010 Risk Management 
Committee in the lead with Chief Risk Officer (CRO) 
is responsible for organizing of risk management 
system, introduction of bank overall risk governance 
strategy and control of its adherence. These Principles 
also state that to achieve higher efficiency CRO as a 
senior executive should have independence.  
Let’s have a look on how it is realized in today’s 
banks. First of all, some banks (especially in countries 
with weak or transforming banking systems) don’t 
have special committee to deal with risks at corporate 
governance level. According to statistical data, in 
such cases risk governance is delivered to Audit 
Committee or CEO as one of numerous tasks.  
Secondly, we must underline that in most of 
banks CRO is usually subordinate to CEO, in other 
cases – to other chief executive (e.g. CFO). To some 
extension it lengthens a period of reporting and, as a 
result, of decision-making. Such subordination 
models can also bring to information asymmetry and 
to some degree commit the principle of independence. 
According to recent corporate governance practice in 
banks CRO may also subordinate straightly to Board. 
This model of reporting may help to avoid drawbacks 
mentioned above and to enhance risk governance in 
the banking institution. 
In the context of risk governance one must 
define obvious difference between its implementation 
in commercial and investment banks which is 
explained by the distinctions in their activity. Specific 
character of investment banking lies down in absence 
of cash deposits; in selling securities to entities or to 
the government; in matching sellers and buyers of 
securities; advising about mergers and acquisitions. 
The other peculiarity of investment banks is that it 
doesn’t realize lending activities, so their risk 
tolerance level is higher versus commercial banks. 
Investment banks serve clients who already may have 
huge amounts of capital as a rule, while commercial 
banks (especially retail-oriented) may cater for 
consumer categories that need the seed capital or need 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 10, Issue 3, 2013, Continued - 2 
 
 
314 
to maintain routine necessities. That explains the total 
opposite interests among these types of banking.  
Summarizing we must note that commercial and 
investing activity must be distinguished due to 
specificity of the last.  
We must also underline that the problem of 
liquidity is urgent especially for investment banks. 
According to new Basel recommendations it is 
expected to form more reserve buffers to maintain 
banking activity: it is supposed to direct all retained 
profits to insure risks by force of risk-weighted asset 
generation. In this case the problems with liquidity 
may rise in investment banks due to absence of 
deposits and incomes from crediting. The effective 
risk governance may become the way of problem-
solving. The idea of distinguishing commercial and 
investment banking has been suggested in Glass-
Steagall Act (1933), Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999), 
Vickers Report (2010), Volcker Rule (2012).  The 
recommendation to separate high-risk (proprietary 
trading of securities and derivatives) and classical 
banking activities is also stated by the High-level 
Expert Group to reduce possible risks, both local and 
systemic 
15
. 
The aim of the investigation is to define the role 
of CRO in corporate governance and to show the 
interrelation between the way of CRO subordination 
and performance of investment bank. As noticed 
above these problems are urgent nowadays, that 
totally explains the actuality of this research.  
 
2. Literature Review  
 
The special role and relationship between the CRO, 
risk governance and bank has been highlighted in the 
business newspapers (Dan Borge, 2010
16
; Eric 
Holmquist, 2011
17
; James Lam, 1997
18
), in various 
reports (Protiviti Inc, 2011
19
; Charles R. Lee and 
Prakash Shimpi, 2005
20
; Risk Reward Limited, 
2010
21
, Barclays PLC Annual Report, 2010
22
). The 
main idea of this articles and reviews is that by 
                                                          
15
 Liikanen, E. (2012) High-level Expert Group on reforming 
the structure of the EU banking sector 
16
 Dan Borge (2010) Don't Bank Too Much on the Chief Risk 
Officer. U.S. Banker;Jun2010, Vol. 120 Issue 6, p38 
17
 Eric Holmquist (2011) The Evolving Role of the Chief Risk 
Officer. ERM Advantages - http://ermadvantage.com/2011 
/11/01/evolving-role-of-the-cro/ 
18
 “Emergence of the Chief Risk Officer,” by James C. Lam 
and Brian M. Kawamoto, Risk Management, September 
1997, pp. 30-35. 
19
 Board Risk Oversight – A Protiviti Survey Commissioned 
by COSO (2011). Protiviti Inc. - http://commerce.depaul.edu/ 
sev/docs/2011/4-
DePaul_COSO_Forum_Board_Risk_Oversight.pdf 
20
 Charles R. Lee and Prakash Shimpi, 2005. Risk 
Management Magazine, September 2005 issue, pages 34- 
38. 
21
 Basel III and the Challenges to Bank IT. Risk Reward 
Limited, 2010 - http://www.riskrewardlimited.com/admin/ 
pdf/Global%20Risk%20Update%20April%202012.pdf 
22
 Barclays Bank PLC Annual report 2010 (2011) - 
http://reports.barclays.com/ar10/files/Annual_Report_2010.pd
f 
committing to employing a chief risk officer, the bank 
creates one central, highly qualified individual that 
can develop a solid risk framework and assist 
management in ensuring that it is consistently 
utilized. As a result, this has a profound impact on 
reducing losses and preserving capital and 
shareholder equity. 
Nowadays between modern scientists and 
economists there are several views on the importance 
and accountability of the CRO. In many instances, the 
CRO reports to the CFO or CEO, and some CROs 
have a direst reporting line to the board of directors.  
Our study complements Shane Phillips (2011) 
who examined the CRO`s duties and claimed that 
CRO must be able to discuss market trends in depth, 
able to stave off downside exposures early on and 
help course correct the organizations position. The 
best CROs have the pulse of the market and are able 
to stay clear of bubbles before they burst. Moreover, 
they must possess a deep understanding of their 
clients’ counterparty risk and are able to identify 
secondary risks in a jiffy. This sometimes means 
changing strategy mid-stride and can often find them 
locking horns with business heads.  
According to Anette Mikes (2008)
23
 distinguish 
the role of the CRO depending on the type of risk 
governance function an organization adopts. In this 
case, the author highlights four types of risk function 
such as: “compliance champion” - the risk function is 
focused on delivering compliance with pressing; 
“modelling expert - the risk function is focused on 
highly sophisticated risk modelling, and delivering the 
most advanced measurement and compliance options 
from the regulatory menu; “strategic adviser” - senior 
risk officers gain board-level visibility and influence 
predominantly as a result of the amount of knowledge 
they command of the business, and experience of 
what can go wrong; and “strategic controller” - 
having built sophisticated firm-wide risk models, 
capable of giving an aggregate view of the financial 
risks, the risk function enables the company to operate 
a formal risk-adjusted performance management 
system. 
Vincent Aebi, Gabriele Sabato, and Markus 
Schmid (2011)
24
 dedicated to this issue more 
comprehensive analysis of the influence of the “risk 
governance” on the banks` performance. Their 
findings indicate that banks, in which the CRO reports 
directly to the board of directors, perform 
significantly better in the financial crisis while banks 
in which the CRO reports to the CEO perform 
significantly worse than other banks in our sample. In 
                                                          
23
 Mikes, Anette, Risk Management and Calculative Cultures 
(June 1, 2008). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138636 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1138636 
24
 Schmid, Markus M., Sabato, Gabriele and Aebi, Vincent, 
Risk Management, Corporate Governance, and Bank 
Performance in the Financial Crisis (October 11, 2011). 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1942896 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1942896 
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fact, the main reason for such results, they explain by 
the conflict of interests, which appears between the 
CEO and CRO, when one reports to the other. To be 
more specific, they emphasize that the CEOs’ main 
interest is to maximize growth in sales, assets, and 
profits – possibly both in the shareholders’ as well as 
his own interest as growth helps to maximize the 
value of the personal remuneration package as well as 
prestige and power (e.g., managerial empire building). 
Hence, the assessment and treatment of risk might be 
a lower priority for a CEO. Their research underlines 
the necessity of having CEO and CRO at the same 
level, ideally both reporting to the board of directors. 
Moreover, the burning problems of risk 
governance are being actively considered by the 
members of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision and there recommendations were 
presented in the Third Basel Accord (Basel III). The 
most important issues according risk governance have 
been implemented in the following recommendations 
about the increase of requirements for risk 
governance: banks need to hold 4.5 % of common 
equity in comparison of 2% in Basel II and 6% of Tier 
I capital of risk-weighted assets (RWA) in 
comparison of 4% in Basel II. Basel III offers 
additional mandatory capital conservation buffer of 
2.5% and discretionary countercyclical buffer, which 
allows national regulators to require up to another 
2.5% of capital during periods of high credit growth. 
In addition, Basel III introduces a minimum 3% 
leverage ratio and two required liquidity ratios (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010). 
 
3. Legislative framework 
 
The crisis has denied a number of stereotypes, which 
existed in the theory and practice of corporate 
governance recently. Banks continue to face 
challenges in their activities which are not adequately 
settled by corporate law.  
Risk minimizing issue is one of the most 
significant tasks in terms of global financial market 
vulnerability. CRO position is one of the most 
effective components of the quality risk management 
system, which plays an important role in the decision 
making process.  
Below it’s considered how the responsibilities 
and requirements for the CRO defined in the 
principles, codes and rules of corporate governance, 
which are recognized as the major in the field. For 
convenience, they’re divided into four main groups 
(all acts included are in the table 1, Appendix A).  
International Corporate Governance Principles 
analyzed include 3 main documents: OECD 
Corporate Governance principles, ICSGN Statement 
on Global Corporate Governance Principles and 
Euroshareholders Corporate Governance Guidelines. 
The first one is mostly devoted to protecting 
shareholders rights and identifying Board of Directors 
functions. Risk management issue is mentioned as a 
necessity to conduct the external audit. In the ICSGN 
CG Principles the requirements to board structure and 
key committees (including audit committee) are 
established in the 5-th section, but there are no words 
according to CRO and risk governance. 
Euroshareholders Corporate Governance Guidelines 
focuses on requirements to non-executive and 
independent directors, board structure and 
information disclosure.  
The next distinguished group of regulative 
documents is Basic Corporate Governance Codes. It 
includes «The Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance», «German Corporate Governance 
Code», «The UK Corporate Governance Code». The 
first one focuses on audit committees and auditors 
requirements, functions and responsibilities. In the 
section devoted to Internal Control issues it’s 
mentioned that “The board should, at least annually, 
conduct a review … The review should cover all 
material controls, including financial, operational and 
compliance controls and risk management systems”25. 
German CG Code establish some rules for 
Supervisory Board structure including audit 
committee: “The Supervisory Board shall set up an 
Audit Committee which, in particular, handles issues 
of accounting, risk governance and compliance, the 
necessary independence required of the auditor, the 
issuing of the audit mandate to the auditor, the 
determination of auditing focal points and the fee 
agreement”26. So it combines the risk governance and 
audit functions. In the UK CG Code the section C is 
devoted to “Risk Management and Internal Control”. 
It states that “the board is responsible for determining 
the nature and extent of the significant risks it is 
willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives. 
The board should maintain sound risk governance and 
internal control systems”27 and identify the role, 
functions and responsibilities of audit committee.  
Basic reports in Corporate Governance include a 
lot of published papers in different regulation issues: 
«The Modern Corporation and Private Property», 
"Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting", "Cadbury Report. The Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance", "King Report on 
Corporate Governance", "Rutteman Report on 
Internal Control and Financial Reporting", 
"Greenbury Report on Directors Remuneration", 
"Vienot Report. The Boards of Directors of Listed 
Companies in France", "Peter’s Report. 
Recommendations on Corporate Governance in the 
Netherlands", "Hampel Report on Corporate 
Governance", "Turnbull Guidance on Internal 
Control", and etc. Among them the Smith Report 
should be mentioned since it is connected to audit 
committee’s responsibility. It states that one of audit 
committee’s function is “to review the company’s 
                                                          
25
 Section 1, C, The Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance, 2003. 
26
 Section 5.3.2 German Corporate Governance Code 
27
 UK CG Code 
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internal financial control system and, unless addressed 
by a separate risk committee or by the board itself, 
risk management systems”28. It states that executives 
are responsible for the identification, assessment, 
management and monitoring of risk, for developing, 
operating and monitoring the system of internal 
control and for providing assurance to the board that it 
has done so
29
. The role, responsibility and 
requirements to CRO are not mentioned. The 
Turnbull Report pays a lot of attention to the risk 
management issues. It identifies the components of 
internal control system and stages of assessing the 
effectiveness of the company's risk and control 
processes, role of Board of directors, Managers and 
Auditors
30. But all issues connected to risk manager’s 
appointment requirements are not considered, and it 
did not require, the board to express an opinion on the 
effectiveness of the system. 
One of the most important reports in to corporate 
governance in banking is David Walker’s one (2009). 
It includes recommendations on board size, 
composition and qualification, functioning of the 
board and evaluation of performance, the role of 
institutional shareholders, remuneration and 
governance of risk. The last one contains 
requirements for FTSE 100-listed bank or Life 
Insurance Company to establish a board risk 
committee separately from the audit committee, with 
the chief risk officer reporting in to the committee as 
well as the chief executive. In addition, the risk 
committee should be chaired by a non-executive 
director, who should carry out a due diligence 
appraisal of any strategic transaction as a matter of 
good practice
31
.  
Specific International Banking Regulation Rules 
are issued by Basel Committee. They consists of set 
of Basel requirements on capital adequacy, liquidities 
normative and corporate governance standards issued 
in 1988, 2006, 2009, 2010 and 2011 (Appendix A).  
The Basel recommendations are an attempt to 
provide the appropriate system of internal control 
using the capital adequacy requirement as the main 
tool but looking back at the events of financial crises 
(2008) we could identify the lack of risk governance 
requirements as one of investment banking collapse 
reasons. The differences in the risk weighted assets 
calculations across banks and countries caused to 
overstatement of capital adequacy ratio. As a result 
the mortgage crises began in 2007. If we compare 
Basel II and III (2010) requirements the main changes 
are the following: 
- improving the quality, transparency and 
sustainability capital requirements with 
restrictions for first Tier and commissioning of 
the new concept of "Common Equity Tier 1”; 
                                                          
28
 Section 2.1, Smith Report 
29
 Section 5.7. Smith Report 
30
 Turnbull report 
31
 Walker report 
- increasing demand for capital coverage of risk. 
Committee proposed to strengthen the capital 
adequacy requirements for counterparty credit 
risk arising from derivatives, repurchase 
agreements and financing activities related 
operations with securities; 
- implementing leverage as a supplement to an 
approach that takes into account the level of risk 
in the capital adequacy ratio in the Basel II; 
- implementing minimum limits for liquidity ratio 
to short-term and long-term requirements; 
- creating capital buffers to ensure the formation 
of capital reserves in good times which could be 
used during a crisis. 
It should be mentioned there were no 
requirements for corporate governance in the Basel I 
and II recommendations before crisis. But the one of 
documents which included to Basel III issued in 2010 
pays a lot of attention to corporate governance in 
banking that illustrated even in the title – Basel 
Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance. The 
principle 6 is devoted to the problem of risk 
managing. It determines the components of risk 
management, requirements to CRO, scope of 
responsibilities, stature and independence of the risk 
management function, resources for internal control 
and requirements to personnel qualifications.  
According to Principles, the role of the CRO 
should be distinct from other executive functions and 
business line responsibilities, and there generally 
should be no “dual hatting”. Formal reporting lines 
may vary across banks, but regardless of these 
reporting lines, the independence of the CRO is 
paramount. While the CRO may report to the CEO or 
other senior management, the CRO should also report 
and have direct access to the board and its risk 
committee without impediment
32
 [sec 3, p.6].  
Basel recommendations form the regulative 
framework for all commercial banks. But investment 
banks provide a specific range of services (table 1), 
and all of them are followed by high risks both 
banking (internal) and external. That’s why some 
rules could play the specific role for their 
performance. One of the most important issues is risk 
weighted assets. 
 
                                                          
32
 Section 3, p.6. Basel Principles for Enhancing Corporate 
Governance. 
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Table 1. Overview of financial services in investment banks 
 
№ Service type Service content 
1 Investment banking 
Underwriting for public authorities, local authorities, corporations, M&A service, 
investment consulting 
2 Brokerage 
The stock market, stock market fixed-rate, mortgage market and the real estate 
market, commodity market. 
3 
Investment Management 
Services 
Creating and managing various types of funds, asset management for the 
population, trust management for investors 
4 Services 
Credit support to investors, credit support of issuers, foreign exchange transactions, 
clearing and settlement, insurance, analytical support 
 
According to Basel II investment banks had 
relatively lower RWAs densities comparing to retail 
banks because of large trading portfolio which 
characterized by lower risk weights than for banking 
book assets. But Basel III increased the requirements 
for market risks estimation that could lead to 
improving the RWAs of investment banks.  
One more factor which influence the risk 
management in investment banks is the portfolio 
maturity: the longer dated assets mean higher risk 
weight because of greater uncertainty in possible 
losses. As investment banks have long-term assets as 
they have the reason for raising the risks weight. Also 
the capital adequacy ratio declining is expected 
because of changing in capital structure requirements 
(privileged shares are excluded from common equity, 
subordinated debt divided by category, additional 
(CET1) level allocated in the structure of capital).  
Taking into considerations all issues above it 
could be assumed that rising of risk weighted assets 
theoretically could lead to declining the ROA and 
ROE ratio. Simultaneously, strengthening the risk 
management system through risk recovery ratios in 
investment banks will not allow improving the 
process of decision making significantly. That’s why 
other tools (like the adequate, strong and clear 
requirements to corporate governance system at al) 
are more appropriate for safety business activity. One 
of the most significant ones the CRO could be. 
So, looking through basic legislation in 
Corporate Governance devoted to internal control 
issue (Appendix A, table 1) it could be made some 
conclusions: the risk management issues was not 
under active discussion since 2002; the main attention 
in legislation paid at audit committees requirements 
and internal control system (without specifying); 
financial crises in 2008 stimulated the development of 
risk governance; the CRO responsibilities, role, 
accountability and appointment requirements are not 
determined clearly.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Research framework 
 
4.1. Sample 
 
At the date there is a trend to elimination of borders 
between investment banks and commercial banks, 
because banking activity is becoming more universal. 
A lot of financial organizations are permitted to serve 
banking classical and investment products.  
Legislation looks at the issue from another point 
of view and defines investment bank as a bank that 
assists in increasing capital by performing 
intermediary operations between the issuer of 
securities and investors, in particular underwriting, 
facilitating mergers and acquisitions, corporate 
restructuring, brokerage, market making, trading of 
derivative, foreign exchange, equity securities etc.  
The issue is that there are no accurate criteria, 
for example, volume of assets in investing operations; 
share of incomes from investment products in net 
revenue; absence of deposit services and total 
domination of investment services. In this response 
one can affirm the existence of the problem of 
working out the features of investment banks and 
separating them from commercial ones.  
Nowadays the bank is considered as investment 
in case if it positions itself as investment bank, 
assisting in mergers and acquisitions procedures, 
offering underwriting and advising services, trading 
of derivatives, equity securities and conducting other 
investment products. On the base of analysis it is 
proposed to divide banks conducting investment 
operations into three categories: 
1) investments banks – those that implement 
investment operations only; 
2) universal banks that implement both operations 
specific for commercial (taking deposits, giving 
loans) and investment banking. These are 
usually big banks with investment banking 
divisions; 
3) parent universal banks that offer commercial 
products and have special investment affiliate 
that often operates with separate balance. 
Aiming to get an image on the point Tables 2 
and 3 presents the summary of unit weight of 
investment operations revenue in bank’s net revenue.  
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Table 2. Unit weight of investment operations in net revenue of largest banks (by volume of assets) 
 
№ Bank 
Country  
of origin 
Unit weight of investment operations in bank net 
revenue, % 
1.  Macquarie Group Limited Australia 88,6 
2.  Deutsche Bank Germany 85,5 
3.  Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 
S.p.A.  
Italy 80,8 
4.  Credit Suisse Switzerland 46,9 
5.  ABN AMRO Bank N.V. Netherlands 43,9 
6.  Wells Fargo & Company USA 42,8 
7.  China Construction Bank 
Corporation 
China 40,2 
8.  Nomura Japan 34,9 
9.  J.P. Morgan Chase USA 32,5 
10.  HSBC  UK 32,2 
11.  Citi USA 29,7 
12.  Crédit Agricole S.A. France 29 
13.  The Royal Bank of Scotland Group 
plc  
UK 25,6 
14.  Commerzbank AG Germany 23,5 
15.  Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Japan 23,5 
16.  BNP Paribas France 22,9 
17.  Société Générale S.A. France 22,2 
18.  Lloyds Banking Group plc UK 19,2 
19.  M&T Bank USA 19 
20.  BB&T Corporation USA 16,9 
21.  Bank of China Limited China 13,6 
22.  Santander Spain 10,2 
 
Note: Calculated on the base of banks’ annual reports (2011) 
 
Table 3. Investment banking affiliates of largest banks (by volume of assets) 
 
№ Investment banking affiliate Parent bank Total assets, bln USD Country of origin 
1.  Barclays Capital Barclays 2508.0 UK 
2.  Merrill Lynch Bank of America 2129.0 USA 
3.  UBS Investment Bank UBS 1607.0 Switzerland 
4.  Goldman Sachs Goldman Sachs 923.2 USA 
5.  RBC Capital Markets Royal Bank of Canada 798.5 Canada 
6.  Morgan Stanley Morgan Stanley 749.9 USA 
7.  BMO Capital Markets Bank of Montreal 477.0 Canada 
 
Note: Calculated on the base of banks’ annual reports (2011) 
 
The sample consists of observations for 29 
biggest banks (by volume of assets) implementing 
world-wide investment activity. The banks are 
originated in USA (8), Eastern Europe (14), China 
(2), Japan (2), Canada (2), and Australia (1) (Table 1 
and 2). Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate the geographic 
spread of peer group. We selected the institutions 
which are covered in Morgan Stanley Research 
Report
33
 and Accenture Report
34
 as representative 
examples of investment banking business in up-to-
                                                          
33
 Morgan Stanley Research “Wholesale & Investment 
Banking Outlook” (March, 2011) 
34
 Emerging Markets. The opportunities for investment banks 
(2012) 
date conditions. The advantage of the sample is 
banks’ domination on the world investment banking 
market both in developed countries and emerging 
countries.
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Figure 1. Geographic spread of peer group 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Geographic spread of European banks of peer group 
 
 
 
The researched time period covers one-year term 
(2011).  
The data about risk governance structure and 
character in observed banks is originally collected 
from annual financial reports, corporate governance 
reports and other official presented information on the 
date of the end 2011. In this research, we use survey 
data for Chief Risk Officer (CRO) and Risk 
Management Committee (RMC). In the context of 
investigation of CRO role we took into account the 
following factors: presence of CRO or similar 
executive; CRO subordination; CRO terms of 
reference; qualification; access to the Board of 
Directors; CRO independence. We also hand-collect 
data concerning presence of Risk Management 
Committees in banks and investigated their types, 
depending on dealing with all or only with certain 
bank risks. In some investigated banks there is no 
Risk Committee, in this case risk management 
function is delegated to Audit Committee which also 
has been researched. 
 
 
 
4.2. Methodological approach and 
financial performance variables 
description 
 
The main aim of the following article is to identify the 
exclusive role of Risk Management Committee in part 
of the Chief Risk Officer Independence in the sphere 
of modern investment banking. This problem has 
found the special relevance during and after economic 
collapse, which have run down the financial market in 
2008. 
The empirical analysis of risk governance in 
investment banking is based on two different groups 
of factors, which could be used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of risk governance in this sphere: 
internal and external factors (figure 3). 
The most significant impact on the investment 
banks` performance in our calculations is given to the 
adequacy of bank capital standards according to the 
Basel III recommendations about the measures of 
Common Equity Tier 1. The fact is connected with 
the extremely high risk taking by investment banks 
during their operation activity. That’s why the high 
measures of Common Equity Tier 1 shows the ability 
of investment bank to cover risky assets and to be 
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stable  during the crisis, what is particularly important 
after the financial crisis of 2008-2009. 
The null hypothesis of this paper is that observed 
Basel III recommendations will present significant 
decrease of the main bank performance factors, such 
as ROATA and ROE, which will have the negative 
influence on the general financial performance of 
investment banking activity.  
 
Figure 3. The main factors which influence on the investment banks` performance in case of risk governance 
 
 
 
Traditional performance measures are cognate to 
those applied in classic banking industry, including 
return on average tangible assets (ROATA – Net 
Income/Tangible Average Assets; Tangible Assets are 
Total Assets minus Intangible Assets, for instance, 
Goodwill, Brands, and intellectual capital such as 
trademarks, patents, copyrights, etc.) and return on 
equity (ROE) being the most broadly used. As well, 
we have included to this group the typically important 
factor as Price to Book Ratio, the main aim is to 
compare a company`s book value to its current market 
price. Book value is an accounting term denoting the 
portion of the company held by the shareholders at 
accounting value (not market value). In other words, 
book value is the company`s total tangible assets less 
its total liabilities. 
As a result, we assume that recommendations 
regarding Basel III standards about capital adequacy 
will negatively influence on the effectiveness of 
selected financial indicators (especially ROATA and 
ROE), in particular at high investment banks` risk 
assets covering, which represent the bulk of the assets 
structure, the figures of ROATA and ROE cannot be 
high enough that affect the entire operations of these 
financial intermediaries. 
Among the wide range of investment banks` 
performance measures by theorists and practitioners 
alike, a differentiation can be made between 
traditional financial factors and corporate governance 
evaluation in the part of the CRO role. Both the 
financial indicators and the CRO role in the 
investment banking are choice variables that result to 
maximizing investment banks performance and 
establishment of banks` stability. 
CRO role in the corporate governance process is 
used as a metric for assessing the effectiveness of 
corporate governance because it is frequent and 
Risk Management Analyses in Investment Banking 
(influences) 
Analysis of CRO Impact 
Evaluation of Financial 
Performance 
 
Risk Management 
Committee 
(RMC) factors 
CRO 
factors 
Standards on bank 
capital adequacy 
(Basel III) 
Financial 
indicators 
(Traditional) 
  RMC presence 
 Independence of 
RMC members 
 Quantity of non-
executive members in 
RMC 
 
  CRO presence 
 Subordination of CRO in 
bank and possibility of 
access to the Board 
 CRO presence in the 
Board of Directors 
 
 ROATA 
 ROE 
 P/B ratio 
 Common Equity Tier 
1 must be at least 4.5% of 
risk-weighted assets at all 
times 
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observable risk management performance in 
investment banking.  
 
4.3. Risk Governance Variables 
 
In this research we collected data concerning features 
of Risk Committees and CRO as the main subjects of 
risk governance at senior level. 
The first collected variable is Risk Management 
Committee presence. Due to high riskiness of 
investment banking if the bank has special Executive 
Committee it enables more effective risk governance. 
It also promotes to develop overall risk management 
strategy within the bank and to account integral 
image. In majority of investigated banks overall 
RMC
35
 functions which conducts with the main types 
of bank risks, particularly market, credit and 
operational ones. In individual banks (ABN AMRO 
Bank N.V., Crédit Agricole S.A., Société Générale 
S.A., M&T Bank) the duties of risk governance are 
delegated to Audit Committee
36
. In Banca Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena S.p.A. these functions are executed by 
Internal Control Committee.  
The second variable is independence of Risk 
Committee members. New York Stock Exchange 
Listed Company Manual and other applicable law 
determine independence requirements that are the 
following
37
:  
- all loans, deposit, investment, fiduciary, or other 
relationships with the bank or any of its 
subsidiaries are conducted in the ordinary way 
without preferential; 
- has no material relationship with the bank or any 
of its subsidiaries; 
- employee of the bank or a director whose 
immediate family member is an executive 
officer of this bank or any of its subsidiaries is 
not independent until three years after the end of 
such employment relationship. Employment as 
an interim Chairman or CEO does not disqualify 
a director from being considered independent 
following such employment;  
- person who receives, or whose immediate family 
member receives, more than $120,000 per year 
in direct compensation from the bank or any of 
its subsidiaries, other than director and 
committee fees and pension or other forms of 
deferred compensation for prior service 
(provided such compensation is not contingent 
in any way on continued service), is not 
independent until three years after he/she ceases 
                                                          
35
 It also entitled as Internal Control, Risk Management and 
Compliance Committee; Board Risk Committee; Risk Policy 
Committee; Enterprise Risk Committee; Risk management 
and Finance Committee; Executive and Risk management 
committee, but the obligations are similar 
36
 In individual banks they are titled as Internal Control 
Committee; Audit & Risk committee; Audit, Internal Control 
and Risk Committee 
37
 NYSE Listed Company Manual, 303A.02 Independence 
Tests 
to receive more than $120,000 per year in such 
compensation etc. 
In researched sample (excluded banks that don’t 
have special committee for risk governance) in 17 
banks the members are independent. In individual 
organizations (Santander Group, Bank of China 
Limited, Crédit Agricole S.A., Société Générale S.A. 
and Macquarie Group Limited) only half or less of 
committee members meet specified requirement. In 
other cases corporate governance codes don’t make 
this term.  
The third characteristic is definition whether 
members of Risk Committee are executive. The 
research showed that in most of banks the committee 
is formed by all non-executive Board of Directors 
members; in half executive and non-executive; or 
only executives. 
The other subgroup applies to CRO presence and 
characteristics. Thus, the fourth variable is presence 
of an official responsible for risk governance 
organizing in bank. These duties according to Basel 
Recommendations advisable should be carried out by 
CRO as it is implemented in selected set of banks. 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch, M&T Bank, Banca 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A., Bank of China 
Limited, Grupo Santander don’t have clear distinction 
of risk governance duties to definite executive. Title 
“Chairman Credit Policy Committee” may also stand 
for CRO (e.g. Citi).  
The fifth variable is subordination of CRO in 
bank, which also includes the possibility of CRO 
access to the Board. Their partnership intends to: 
- understand the role of the Board in risk 
governance; 
- appoint more risk professionals on bank Boards; 
- ensure an effective Risk Committee of the 
Board; 
- enhance the independence of the risk function; 
- integrate board oversight of strategy and risk 
governance; 
- establish mutually supportive working 
relationship of the CRO and Board of Directors, 
free access to relevant information and data 
By this criterion one can distinguish three group 
of banks: 
1st – CRO reports to the CEO (9), 
2d - CRO reports to the other chief executive, 
for example Chief Financial Officer or a President (2), 
3d - CRO reports directly to the Board (15).  
In most of the sample CRO have direct access to 
the Board of Directors in connection with informing 
and advising concerning further bank risk strategy. 
While the CRO may report to the CEO or other senior 
management, the CRO should also report and have 
direct access to the board and its risk committee 
without impediment. 
The sixth variable implies CRO presence in the 
Board of Directors. In four selected banks CRO is a 
member of the Board, while in some institutions they 
represented by Executive Board deputies (Credit 
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Suisse) or Supervisory Board (Commerzbank AG). In 
individual banks Chief Risk Officer doesn’t refer to 
governance level, but to management, that testifies 
practically about absence of official responsible for 
risk governance in bank.  
 
5. Calculations and results interpretation 
 
With the aim to evaluate and compare financial 
performance of selected banks the construction of 
synthetic key performance indicator (SKPI) is worked 
out. The analysis of financial performance is based on 
weighted four variables: common equity Tier 1 (CET 
1), return on equity (ROE), return on average tangible 
assets (ROATA) and price to book ratio (P/B). The 
weight of each measure has been calculated using the 
first formula of Fishburn (1970) due to the fact that 
selected indicators are subject to a number of 
priorities that form the descending arithmetic 
sequence: 
 
 
)1(
12



NN
jN
ri
 
(
(1) 
 
where:  
ir  - weight of the i variable of bank’s financial 
performance, 
N – total number of selected variables of bank’s 
financial performance, 
j – priority level of the variable characterizing 
bank’s financial performance. 
SKPI is calculated by the following formula: 
 
1,0/2,03,04,01  nBPnROATAnROEnCETnSKPI  (2) 
 
where:  
n –  banks under research (n = 1…29). 
The results of calculations are presented in 
Appendix 2 (table 1). Investigated banks are ranked 
by the level of their synthetic key performance 
indicator and divided into 5 tires (Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Performance tires of investment banks’ sample 
 
Tier 1 
( ≥ 0,2) 
Tier 2 
(0,15-0,2) 
Tier 3 
(0,1-0,15) 
Tier 4 
(0,05-0,1) 
Tier 5 
( 0,05) 
1. RBC 
 
2. Bank of 
Montreal 
1.1. Bank of China Limited 
1.2. Wells Fargo & 
Company 
 
2.1. China Construction 
Bank Corporation 
2.2. BB&T Corporation 
2.3. M&T Bank 
2.4. HSBC 
1.1. Citi  
1.2. J.P. Morgan 
 
2. UBS 
 
3.1. Santander Group 
3.2. Goldman Sachs 
 
4.1. Credit Suisse 
4.2. BNP Paribas 
4.3. Macquarie 
Group Limited 
4.4. Deutsche Bank 
1.1. The Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group plc  
1.2. Nomura Group 
1.3. Mitsubishi UFJ Financial 
Group, Inc. 1.4. Lloyds 
Banking Group plc 
1.5. Morgan Stanley 
1.6.Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch 
1.7. Barclays 
 
2.1. Commerzbank AG 
2.2. Société Générale S.A. 
3. ABN AMRO Bank N.V 
 
4. Crédit Agricole S.A. 
1. Banca 
Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena 
S.p.A.  
 
The first one consists of banks where SKPI is 
more than 0,21. It includes 2 banks and both of them 
are Canadian. This phenomen is connected with high 
level of B/P ratio, and it’s not unexpected. The World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 
rated Canada’s banking system as the most sound in 
the world
38
. Besides, Canadian banks are recognized 
as the most successful and stable in the world by 
Bloomberg Markets 
39
. Experts believe that the main 
                                                          
38
  Klaus Schwab. World Economic Forum, the Global 
Competitiveness Report 2012-2013. Avaliable at: 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitiveness
Report_2012-13.pdf  
39
  Robert S. Dieterich. Most Influential 50 in 2012 Shows 
Turmoil: Bloomberg Markets. Avaliable at: 
reason of Canadian lending institutions success is the 
natural conservatism inherent in this country – 
significant capital adequacy ratio, conservative culture 
of borrowing and strong financial supervision by a 
single regulator - Office of the Superintendent of 
Financial Institutions(OSFI). In spite of relatively low 
tier 1 capital ratio investors estimate Canadian banks 
as perspective for lending. Therefore OSFI pursues 
moderate policy of Basel 3 requirements.  
The second tier includes 6 banks with SKPI 
value 0,15-0,2. All banks in this group are 
characterized as well performed. But there is a 
difference between European, American and Chinese 
                                                                                        
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-04/most-influential-
50-in-2012-shows-turmoil-bloomberg-markets.html 
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banks. If the first ones are characterized by higher 
score of B/P ratio the second ones have much higher 
CET 1 indicator. It could be explained by the strong 
policy of Chinese government in banking regulation 
as al banks are state owned and therefore they are 
easier to adjust. On the one hand it constrains growth 
of market value, and on the other one it means higher 
requirements to banking. Besides, China, of all 
countries, was adamant that its 16 largest banks will 
implement Basel III recommendations in time – till 
January 1, 2013. Also, after reports from the U.S. to 
postpone the introduction of Basel, in the official 
press in China it was reported intention to introduce 
Basel rules without delay – on 1 January. 
Tier 3 combines European, Australian and 
American banks with SKPI value from 0,1 to 0,15. 
The intermediate level of ratios characterizes the 
majority of banks, but Macquarie group limited is the 
exception because of high level of CET 1 and low B/P 
ratio. It could be explained by following issues. The 
Australian banking sector in 2008 was not under crisis 
pressure (strong banking supervision and distance), 
the finance sector continued to growth in 2011, so 
commercial banks had no losses. But the banking 
sector in Australia is much concentrated; the major 
players are 4 banks: ANZ, Commonwealth Bank 
(CBA), National Australia Bank (NAB) and Westpac. 
The Macquarie group limited credit ratings are not 
high enough to compete with leaders.  
Tier 4 includes 11 banks with SKPI value from 
0,5 to 0,1. The most interesting in these group 
Japanese banks are. They’re characterized by high 
enough CET 1 (Nomura group is the leader at al) and 
B/P ratios but ROE is lower. It could be a 
consequence of the earthquake in Japan in 2011, 
which was reflected in reduction of performance 
indicators. So it could be assumed that Japanese banks 
will be exceptions in their group in our research. 
Tier 5 consists of banks with SKPI value less 
than 0,05. It includes only one bank – Banca Monte 
dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A. It has the worse result at al 
that could be explained as aftermath of some scandals 
connected to detection of corruptions schemes. 
Let’s have an overview of correlation between 
corporate governance and financial performance on 
the base defined variables. The tire spread of the first 
variable - RMC presence – is presented on the Table 
5.
 
Table 5. Risk Management Committee or Audit Committee presence in the bank versus performance 
 
Tier 1 
( ≥ 0,2) 
Tier 2 
(0,15-0,2) 
Tier 3 
(0,1-0,15) 
Tier 4 
(0,05-0,1) 
Tier 5 
( 0,05) 
1. RBC 
 
2. Bank of 
Montreal 
1.1. Bank of China 
Limited 
1.2. Wells Fargo & 
Company 
 
2.1. China 
Construction Bank 
Corporation 
2.2. BB&T 
Corporation 
2.3. M&T Bank 
2.4. HSBC 
1.1. Citi  
1.2. J.P. Morgan 
 
2. UBS 
 
3.1. Santander Group 
3.2. Goldman Sachs 
 
4.1. Credit Suisse 
4.2. BNP Paribas 
4.3. Macquarie Group 
Limited 
4.4. Deutsche Bank 
1.1. The Royal Bank of Scotland 
Group plc.  
1.2. Nomura Group 
1.3. Mitsubishi UFJ Financial 
Group, Inc. 1.4. Lloyds Banking 
Group plc. 
1.5. Morgan Stanley 
1.6.Bank of America Merrill Lynch 
1.7. Barclays 
 
2.1. Commerzbank AG 
2.2. Société Générale S.A. 
3. ABN AMRO Bank N.V 
 
4. Crédit Agricole S.A. 
1. Banca 
Monte dei 
Paschi di 
Siena S.p.A.  
 
where: - banks that have overall RMC 
- only Audit Committee in the bank 
 
As Table 5 states Risk Committees are more 
prevalent among top tires (Chinese bank is treated as 
an exception as mentioned above), while worst-
performing banks have only Audit Committees. On 
this base conclusion concerning certain 
interdependence between financial performance of 
investment banks and Risk Management Committee 
can be made. In this light the analysis of other 
characteristic of RMC should be carried out. 
According to independence of risk management 
committee member’s criteria (table 6) investigated 
banks were divided in 4 groups: ones which require 
all members in RMC are independent; majority of 
members (more than a half of total quantity) should 
be independent; the number of independent directors 
is less than 50% of committee; and ones which have 
no requirements for independent directors quantity. 
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Table 6. Requirements to Independence of RMC members 
 
Tier 1 
( ≥ 0,2) 
Tier 2* 
(0,15-0,2) 
Tier 3
10 
(0,1-0,15) 
Tier 4
10 
(0,05-0,1) 
Tier 5
10 
( 0,05) 
1. RBC 1.2. Wells Fargo & 
Company 
1.1 Citi  1.1. The Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group plc  
 
2. Bank of 
Montreal 
2.1. China Construction 
Bank Corporation 
1.2. J.P. Morgan  1.2. Nomura Group  
 2.2 BB&T Corporation 2. UBS 1.4. Lloyds Banking Group 
plc** 
 
 2.4 HSBC 3.2. Goldman Sachs 1.5. Morgan Stanley  
  4.1. Credit Suisse 1.6.Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch 
 
  4.4. Deutsche Bank 1.7. Barclays  
   2.1. Commerzbank AG  
 
where:   -   all members in RMC are independent; 
- the majority of members (more than a half of total quantity) are independent; 
- the number of independent directors is less than 50% committee; 
- there are no requirements for independent directors quantity. 
 
* some banks were excluded because of RMC absence 
** it requires to contact board secretariat for getting information 
 
It was found that worse-performed banks tend to 
have no requirements or non-clear requirements to 
independence of RMC members. The leaders are 
Canadian ones; American and European banks are 
equal in this issue and take the next position. All 
included Japanese banks have no requirements for 
RMC member’s independence.  
The quantity of non-executive members in RMC 
criteria allows to combine investigated banks in 4 
groups too: all members are non-executive; the 
majority of members (more than a half of total 
quantity) are non-executive; the number of non-
executive directors is less than 50% of committee; 
and ones have no requirements of non-executive 
directors quantity (table 7). 
 
Table 7. Requirements to Quantity of non-executive members in RMC 
 
Tier 1 
( ≥ 0,2) 
Tier 2
10 
(0,15-0,2) 
Tier 3
10 
(0,1-0,15) 
Tier 4
10 
(0,05-0,1) 
Tier 5
10 
( 0,05) 
1. RBC 1.2. Wells Fargo & 
Company 
1.1 Citi  1.1. The Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group plc  
 
2. Bank 
of 
Montreal 
2.1. China Construction 
Bank Corporation 
1.2. J.P. Morgan  1.2. Nomura Group  
 2.2 BB&T Corporation 2. UBS 1.4. Lloyds Banking Group 
plc** 
 
 2.4 HSBC 3.2. Goldman Sachs 1.5. Morgan Stanley  
  4.1. Credit Suisse 1.6.Bank of America 
Merrill Lynch 
 
  4.4. Deutsche Bank 1.7. Barclays (at list 2)  
   2.1. Commerzbank AG  
 
where:   -    all members in RMC are non-executive; 
- the majority of members (more than a half of total quantity) are non-executive; 
- the number of non-executive directors is less than 50% of committee; 
- there are no requirements for non-executive directors quantity. 
 
** some banks were excluded because of RMC absence 
 
The tendencies characterized the bank 
diversification according to previous criteria are 
similar to this one: the worse performed banks have 
fewer requirements. Canadian banks require all 
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members are non-executive, American and European 
ones are less strong in general; and Japanese ones 
have no requirements. But it should be mentioned 
some banks which have strong independence 
requirements have no requirements of non-executives 
directors’ quantity. 
The data on the last three variables, devoted to 
CRO presence and its subordination in the bank, is 
shown on the Tables 8 and Table 9. 
 
Table 8. CRO presence in the bank versus performance 
 
Tier 1 
( ≥ 0,2) 
Tier 2 
(0,15-0,2) 
Tier 3 
(0,1-0,15) 
Tier 4 
(0,05-0,1) 
Tier 5 
( 0,05) 
1. RBC 
 
2. Bank of 
Montreal 
1.1. Bank of China 
Limited 
1.2. Wells Fargo & 
Company 
 
2.1. China Construction 
Bank Corporation 
2.2. BB&T Corporation 
2.3. M&T Bank 
2.4. HSBC 
1.1. Citi  
1.2. J.P. Morgan 
 
2. UBS 
 
3.1. Santander 
Group 
3.2. Goldman Sachs 
 
4.1. Credit Suisse 
4.2. BNP Paribas 
4.3. Macquarie 
Group Limited 
4.4. Deutsche Bank 
1.1. The Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group plc.  
1.2. Nomura Group 
1.3. Mitsubishi UFJ Financial 
Group, Inc. 1.4. Lloyds 
Banking Group plc 
1.5. Morgan Stanley 
1.6.Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch 
1.7. Barclays 
 
2.1. Commerzbank AG 
2.2. Société Générale S.A. 
3. ABN AMRO Bank N.V 
 
4. Crédit Agricole S.A. 
1. Banca 
Monte dei 
Paschi di 
Siena S.p.A.  
 
where:   - CRO is present in bank 
- absence if risk governance responsible officer 
- presence of other risk governance responsible officer 
 
Obtained results evidence that CRO is present 
almost in all observed banks that conduct investment 
operations. Taking to an account the fact that Wells 
Fargo & Company has been refinanced by state and 
Chinese banks are state-owned, the following 
conclusion can be made: almost in all banks with high 
level of SKPI there is an officer responsible for risk 
governance – CRO. In the worst-performing banks 
(Crédit Agricole S.A., Banca Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena S.p.A.) there is no such executive that can be 
one of the reasons of financial troubles. The 
possibility of CRO access to the Board and its 
subordination, which is presented on the Table 9, 
showed that it isn`t found the correlation between this 
criteria and the financial performance of the bank. 
 
Table 9. CRO presence in the Board of Directors and CRO subordination in the bank 
 
Tier 1 
( ≥ 0,2) 
Tier 2 
(0,15-0,2) 
Tier 3 
(0,1-0,15) 
Tier 4 
(0,05-0,1) 
Tier 5 
( 0,05) 
1. RBC 
 
2. Bank of 
Montreal 
1.1. Wells Fargo & 
Company 
 
2.1. China Construction 
Bank Corporation 
2.2. BB&T 
Corporation 
2.3. HSBC 
1.1. Citi  
1.2. J.P. Morgan 
 
2. UBS 
 
3.1. Santander Group 
3.2. Goldman Sachs 
 
4.1. Credit Suisse 
4.3. Macquarie Group 
Limited 
4.4. Deutsche Bank 
1.1. The Royal Bank of Scotland 
Group plc.  
1.2. Nomura Group 
1.3. Mitsubishi UFJ Financial 
Group, Inc.  
1.4. Lloyds Banking Group plc 
1.5. Morgan Stanley 
1.6. Barclays 
 
2.1. Commerzbank AG 
2.2. Société Générale S.A. 
 
3. ABN AMRO Bank N.V 
 
4. Crédit Agricole S.A. 
 
 
where:   - CRO is present in the Board of Directors 
- CRO is absent in the Board of Directors 
- CRO reports to the CEO 
- CRO reports to the other chief executive, for example Chief Financial Officer or a President 
- CRO reports directly to the Board 
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Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we investigate the influence of risk 
governance, in particular of the CRO role, on the 
investment banks` performance during the post-crisis 
period of 2011. We supplement the financial variables 
with the analysis of impact of CRO variables such as 
CRO presence in investment bank, his/her 
subordination and possibility of access to the Board, 
and CRO presence in the Board of Directors. 
 The most important outcome of our research 
is that investment banks which have special Risk 
Committee perform better after financial crisis than 
banks only with Audit Committee. With that the 
analysis of independence of Risk Management 
Committee shows that RMC with fewer requirements 
perform significantly worse than other investment 
banks in the sample. To sum up, investment banks 
with Chief Risk Officer (as separate position) got high 
level of SKPI, consequently, perform better. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the RMC 
presence in general and the CRO in particular effect 
positively on the financial performance of investment 
banks.  
The results of our paper can serve as a basis for 
further research; in consequence, we can get more 
fundamental findings, using another sample of 
investment banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 10, Issue 3, 2013, Continued - 2 
 
 
327 
Appendix A 
 
Table A 1. Internal Control Issue in CG regulative framework 
 
Year Codes and Principles CRO Audit Function 
Risk Management 
function 
International CG Principles 
1999 
Euroshareholders 
Corporate Governance 
Guidelines 
- - - 
2004 OECD CG Principles - External auditors  - 
2005 
ICSGN Statement on 
Global Corporate 
Governance Principles 
- 
External auditors, 
Audit committee, 
requirements to 
non-executives and 
independent 
directors 
- 
Corporate Governance Codes 
2008 
The Combined Code 
on Corporate 
Governance 
- 
Audit committee, 
requirements to the 
members of Audit 
Committee, 
auditors 
responsibility and 
functions 
- 
2009 
German Corporate 
Governance Code 
- 
Audit committee, 
requirements to the 
members of Audit 
Committee 
- 
2010 
The UK Corporate 
Governance Code 
 
Audit committee, 
requirements to the 
members of Audit 
Committee, 
auditors 
responsibility and 
functions 
Board of Directors 
responsibility for 
sound risk 
management 
system 
Some Reports in Corporate Governance 
2003 Smith Report, UK  
Audit committee, 
requirements to the 
members of Audit 
Committee, 
auditors 
responsibility and 
functions 
The risk committee 
mentioned as one 
of alternatives, but 
there are no 
requirements 
2005 Turnbull Report, UK - - 
Internal control 
system, assessing 
risks and company 
performance, role 
of the Board of 
Directors 
2009 Walker Report 
Board risk committee should be 
established separately from the 
audit committee, with the chief 
risk officer reporting in to the 
committee as well as the chief 
executive. CRO should have a 
direct access to the chairmen of 
the committee. He couldn’t be 
removed without prior 
agreement of the board 
- + 
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Specific Banking Regulation Rules 
1988 Basel I - - + 
Jun 
2006  
Basel II: International 
Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and 
Capital Standards: A 
Revised Framework - 
Comprehensive Version  
- - + 
Apr 
2009  
FSF Principles for 
Sound Compensation 
Practices 
- + + 
Jul 
2009  
Enhancements to the 
Basel II framework  
- - + 
Jul 
2009  
Revisions to the Basel II 
market risk framework - 
final version  
- - + 
 Jul 
2009  
Guidelines for 
computing capital for 
incremental risk in the 
trading book - final 
version  
- - + 
Aug 
2010  
Proposal to ensure the 
loss absorbency of 
regulatory capital at the 
point of non-viability - 
consultative document 
- - + 
2010 
Basel Principles for 
Enhancing Corporate 
Governance 
CRO (or equivalents) 
responsibility, independent 
requirements, risk management 
function 
Audit committee 
or equivalent 
Risk management 
system, risk 
committee 
responsibility, the 
role and 
responsibility of 
Board of Directors, 
personnel 
qualifications 
Dec 
2010 
Results of the 
comprehensive 
quantitative impact 
study  
- - + 
Dec 
2010 
Guidance for national 
authorities operating the 
countercyclical capital 
buffer  
- - + 
Dec 
2010 
Basel III: International 
framework for liquidity 
risk measurement, 
standards and 
monitoring  
- - + 
Dec 
2010 
Capitalisation of bank 
exposures to central 
counterparties - 
consultative document  
- - + 
Jan 
2011  
Final elements of the 
reforms to raise the 
quality of regulatory 
capital issued by the 
Basel Committee   
- + + 
May 
2011 
Range of Methodologies 
for Risk and 
Performance Alignment 
- + + 
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of Remuneration 
Jun 
2011  
Basel III: A global 
regulatory framework 
for more resilient banks 
and banking systems - 
revised version June 
2011   
- + + 
Jul 
2011  
Basel III definition of 
capital - Frequently 
asked questions  
- - + 
Jul 
2011 
Global systemically 
important banks: 
Assessment 
methodology and the 
additional loss 
absorbency requirement 
- consultative document  
- - + 
Jul 
2011 
Pillar 3 disclosure 
requirements for 
remuneration 
- + + 
Jul 
2011  
Basel III framework for 
liquidity - Frequently 
asked questions  
- - + 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B 1. Value of financial indicators and synthetic key performance indicator for selected banks in 2011 
 
# Financial institution ROE, % ROATA, % P/B CET1 SKPI 
Tier 1 ( ≥ 0,2) 
1.  RBC 12,90 0,71 1,79 8,30 0,25 
2.  Bank of Montreal  15,30 0,74 1,47 6,00 0,22 
Tier 2 (0,15-0,2) 
3.  Bank of China Limited 18,27 1,19 0,85 10,40 0,18 
4.  Wells Fargo & Company 11,93 0,46 1,08 7,80 0,18 
5.  China Construction Bank Corporation 22,51 1,40 0,48 11,40 0,16 
6.  BB&T Corporation 7,49 0,91 1,00 9,70 0,16 
7.  M&T Bank 6,12 1,18 1,14 7,15 0,16 
8.  HSBC 10,90 0,81 0,82 10,10 0,16 
Tier 3 (0,1-0,15) 
9.  Citi 6,30 0,55 0,92 7,90 0,14 
10.  J.P Morgan 11,00 0,84 0,72 7,90 0,14 
11.  UBS 8,50 0,39 0,68 8,80 0,13 
12.  Santander Group 7,14 0,52 0,58 8,00 0,11 
13.  Goldman Sachs 3,70 0,27 0,66 8,00 0,11 
14.  Credit Suisse 6,00 0,19 0,61 6,30 0,10 
15.  BNP Paribas 8,80 0,24 0,42 8,50 0,10 
16.  Macquarie Group Limited 8,80 0,59 0,28 11,80 0,10 
17.  Deutsche Bank 8,20 0,20 0,45 7,00 0,10 
Tier 4 (0,05-0,1) 
18.  The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc  10,50 0,81 0,15 11,10 0,09 
19.  Nomura Group 1,40 0,08 0,36 13,00 0,09 
20.  Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc. 4,63 0,29 0,41 8,90 0,09 
21.  Lloyds Banking Group plc 6,99 0,71 0,36 7,70 0,09 
22.  Morgan Stanley 3,90 0,75 0,43 7,90 0,09 
23.  Bank of America Merrill Lynch 4,00 0,74 0,42 7,80 0,09 
24.  Barclays 5,80 0,28 0,33 8,50 0,09 
25.  Commerzbank AG 2,20 0,19 0,29 12,20 0,08 
26.  Société Générale S.A. 3,10 0,20 0,38 9,00 0,08 
27.  ABN AMRO Bank N.V. 7,80 0,26 0,00 10,60 0,07 
28.  Crédit Agricole S.A. -3,30 -0,25 0,30 8,60 0,05 
Tier 5
 
( 0,05) 
29.  Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A.  -33,56 1,56 0,20 9,20 -0,04 
 
 
